

Pols 5010: Democratic Institutions
Tu 4:00PM - 6:30PM

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Office Hours: 11-12:30 on T/Th

"The probability that a basketball team composed of players who are seven feet tall will beat a six-foot team by a number of points depends on the height of the basket."

--Adam Przeworski

"Political institutions...are the structural means by which political winners pursue their own interests, often at the great expense of political losers."

--Terry M. Moe

The goals of this course are (1) to understand the basic variations in democratic institutions around the world, (2) to explore their consequences for how politics is organized, policy outcomes, and democratic stability, and (3) to consider where these institutions come from. If institutions have independent effects, then political scientists have opportunities to shape real world outcomes. However, what we will often see is that the devil is in the details, that the initial models of institutions that comprise much of this literature are too abstract to capture these dynamics, and that policy makers adapt institutions for their own interests in surprising ways. There is less work on institutions being done now than when I first took this course as a graduate student, but the work that is being done is at a much more fine grained level of analysis to try to capture these intermediate dynamics.

After quickly discussing some general theories of institutions and their effects, we will spend the next 6 weeks on the two institutions that get the most attention in the literature: electoral systems and presidentialism. For each topic, we will spend a week on defining the institution and its variants, a week on its consequences, and a week on its causes. There is usually more to talk about in the second week than the third because it is only recently that scholars have really again tried to endogenize institutions. We will then discuss more quickly the internal organization of legislatures, federalism, and courts. We will then conclude with two general discussions of political institutions that combine multiple variables: veto-point theory and consociationalism. We will not cover institutions in authoritarian regimes (though many scholars are working on this right now), bureaucracy, electoral oversight bodies (another recent hot topic), central banks, labor-management bodies, or supra-national institutions.

Course Expectations

This course has a lot of reading; entire courses are often taught about each of these topics. The weeks where we define electoral systems and presidentialism are a little lighter (emphasis on "little") and might be good weeks to jump ahead and get a start on the next week's readings. Students are expected to have done the reading before class and to come prepared to discuss (and critique) the readings. I will generally start the seminar by laying out the basic theoretical field but I expect students to participate. Participation will consist of 35% of the seminar grade.

Because there is so much reading, I will not have you do a research paper. Instead, the course will conclude with a take home exam. It will be open book and open note, like a PhD exam. In fact, its format will be designed to simulate the exam and give you a practice run with much lower stakes (which will not really help the MA students, but at the least it reduces the work load). Thus let me encourage you

to take good notes while you read-both to help in the discussion and as you study for it. The exam will comprise 40% of your final grade.

Each student will also be expected to write two literature reviews that will serve as the basis for oral class presentations and be circulated to members of the seminar on the Sunday evening prior to the seminar in question. Essays should focus on a subtheme situated within the broad area of the weekly readings and critically summarize and discuss some combination of required and supplementary readings. The literature reviews should be analytical rather than descriptive in nature; i.e, they should not merely summarize the literature but analyze key theoretical and methodological issues, compare and contrast the work of different authors, and move beyond a discussion of particular books or articles to reflect more broadly upon the strengths and weaknesses of the literature, as well as suggest new hypotheses and avenues for future research. The essays should be roughly 12 to 15 pages (double-spaced) in length and in format resemble the review essays that are published in journals such as World Politics and Comparative Politics. Each essay is worth 12.5% of the grade.

Required books

Like I said, we are reading a lot this semester. I would encourage you to buy these books because (1) we will read most of them (and so I will not be photocopying them) and (2) I have found that these are books that I have read more than once and are worth owning. There are lots of other good books on institutions, many of them are listed in the “recommended readings”

- Cox, Gary. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge University Press.
- Powell, Bingham. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*. Yale University Press.
- Shugart, Matthew S & John M. Carey. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Lijphart, Arend. 2012. *Patterns of Democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty six countries, second edition*. New Haven: Yale University Press
- Strom, Kaare, Wolfgang C. Müller, Torbjorn Bergman. 2008. *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press.

All journal articles should be available on-line (though I have not checked that in every case) as long as you are logged in to an UConn system via the library. I will make copies of the other book chapters as we go and post them on Husky CT.

Jan 22 Introduction

Jan 29 Basic Models of Institutions

- Knight, Jack. 1992. *Institutions and social conflict*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2 and Chapter 5 (pages 21-47, 123-170)
- North, Douglass C. 1990. *Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pages 1-106.
- Pierson, Paul. 2000. "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," American Political Science Review 94 (June 2000): 251-267.

Recommended:

- Alston, Lee J. Thrainn Eggertsson, and Douglass C. North. 1996. *Empirical Studies in Institutional Change*. New York: Cambridge University Press (I especially like the chapter by Riker and Sened on airport slots)
- Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Drobak, John N. and John V.C. Nye, eds. 1997. *The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics*. London: Academic Press
- Elster, Jon, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss, with Frank Boenker, Ulrike Goetting and Friedbert W. Rüb. 1998. *Institutional Design in Post-communist societies. Rebuilding the Ship at Sea*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goodin, Robert ed., *The Theory of Institutional Design*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Hechter, Michael, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Reinhard Wippler, eds. 1990 *Social Institutions. Their Emergence, Maintenance, and Effects*. New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1990.
- Knight, Jack and Itai Sened, eds. 1995 *Explaining Social Institutions*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Levi, Margret. 1990 "A Logic of Institutional Change," pp. 403-18 in: Karen Schwers Cook and Margret Levi, eds., *The Limits of Rationality*. Chicago: Chicago University Press 1990. (see also the articles by Michael Taylor (222-239) and Russell Hardin (358-77) in the same volume.
- Levi, Margret. 1998. *Of Rule and Revenue*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- North, Douglass C.. 1981. *Structure and Change in Economic History*. New York: Norton, 1981.
- Riker, William H. "The Experience of Creating Institutions: The Framing of the United States Constitution," in *Explaining Social Institutions*, ed. Knight and Sened, pp.121-144.
- Riker, William. "Implications from the disequilibrium of majority rule for the study of institutions." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 74, No.2. (Jun., 1980), pp. 432-446.
- Schotter, Andrew. 1981. *The Economic Theory of Social Institutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Taylor, Michael. 1993. "Structure, Culture, and Action in the Explanation of Social Change," pp. 89-132 in William James Booth, Patrick James, and Hudson Meadwell, *Politics and Rationality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Feb 5 Introduction to Electoral Systems

Note: Class will meet from 6-8:30 today

- Cox, *Making Votes Count*, introduction (3-12), CHAPTER 3 (37-68), and browse through Appendix A (279-302).
- Blais, André and Louis Massicotte. 1997. Electoral Formulas: A Macroscopic Perspective *European Journal of Political Research* 32 (1): 107-129.
- Shugart, Matthew S. and Martin P. Wattenberg. 2001. Mixed Member electoral systems: A definition and typology. In Matthew S. Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg, *Mixed Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?* Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp 9-24.
- Golder, Matt. 2005. "Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946-2000." *Electoral Studies*. 24: 103-121.

Recommended:

- André Blais and Louis Massicotte, "Electoral Systems," pp. 49-82 in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa
- Norris, eds., *Comparing Democracies. Elections and Voting in Global Perspective*. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996.

- Mark P. Jones, "Guide to the Electoral Systems of the Americas," *Electoral Studies*, 14 (1995): 5-21.
- Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose, *The International Almanac of Electoral History*. Third edition. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1991.
- Giovanni Sartori, *Comparative Constitutional Engineering*. New York: New York University Press, 1994. chapters 1-2.
- Shvestsova, Olga. 1999. A survey of post-communist electoral institutions. *Electoral Studies* 18: 3: 397-409.
- Reynolds, Andrew and Ben Reilly 1997, eds. *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design*. Stockholm: IDEA.

Feb 12 Effects of Electoral Systems (on Political Parties)

Required on party systems:

- Cox, *Making Votes Count*, chapters 2 (13-33), chapters 4 through 11 (69-224) and skim chapters 12 through 14 (225-65).
- Lijphart 2012-chapter 5 and chapter 8
- Moser, Robert G. and Ethan Scheiner. 2004. "Mixed Electoral Systems and Electoral System Effects: Controlled Comparison and Cross-National Analysis." *Electoral Studies* 23: 575-599.
- Singer, Matthew M. and Laura Stephenson. "The Political Context and Duverger's Theory: Evidence at the District Level" *Electoral Studies* 28 (3, 2009): 480-91
- Best, Robin E. "The Long and the Short of It: Electoral Laws and the Dynamics of Party System Size in Western Democracies, 1950-2005." *European Journal of Political Research* 29 (1): 105-116.
- Shugart, Matthew and John Carey. 1992. Chapters 11-12

Required on personal voting:

- Ames, Barry "Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation," *American Journal of Political Science* 39, 2 (1995): 406-433.
- Carey, John M. and Matthew Soberg Shugart, "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal vote: a Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas," *Electoral Studies*, 14 (1995) 4: 417-39.
- Crisp, Brian F. Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon, Bradford S. Jones, Mark P. Jones, Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson. 2004. Vote-Seeking Incentives and Legislative Representation in Six Presidential Democracies. *The Journal of Politics* 66 (3): 823-846.

Recommended:

- Krook, Mona L. 2009. *Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Grofman, Bernard, Andre Blais, and Shaun Bowler. 2009. Duverger's Law of Plurality Voting: The Logic of Party Competition in Canada, India, the United Kingdom, and the United States. New York: Springer.
- Moser, Robert G. and Ethan Scheiner. 2012. *Electoral Systems and Political Context: How the Effects of Rules Vary Across New and Established Democracies*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Taagepera, Rein. 2007. *Predicting Party Sizes: the Logic of Simple Electoral Systems*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Singer, Matthew M. 2013. "Was Duverger Correct? Single-Member District Election Outcomes in 53 Countries." *British Journal of Political Science* 43 (January): 201-220.
- Birch, Sarah (2003), 'Two-Round Electoral Systems and Democracy', *Comparative Political Studies* 36:3, 319-344.
- Birch, Sarah (2005), 'Single-Member District Electoral Systems and Democratic Transition', *Electoral Studies* 24, 281-301
- Brambor, Thomas, William Clark & Matt Golder. 2007. "Are African Party Systems Different?" *Electoral Studies* 26: 315-323.
- Clark, William & Matt Golder. 2006. "Rehabilitating Duverger's Theory: Testing the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws." *Comparative Political Studies* 39: 679-708.
- Cohen, Frank (1997), 'Proportional Versus Majoritarian Ethnic Conflict Management in Democracies', *Comparative Political Studies* 30:5, 607-30.
- Coppedge, Michael (1997). "District Magnitude, Economic Performance, and Party System Fragmentation in Five Latin American Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 30(2):156-186.
- Cox, Gary W., Frances M. Rosenbluth, and Michael F. Thies. 2000. "Electoral rules, career ambitions, and party structure: Comparing factions in Japan's upper and lower houses." *AJPS* 44(1) January: 115-122.
- Duverger, Maurice. *Political Parties. Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. New York: Wiley, 1954.
- Elklit, Jorgen (1999), 'Electoral Institutional Change and Democratization: You Can Lead a Horse to Water, But You Can't Make it Drink', *Democratization* 6:4, pp.28-51.
- Gallagher, Michael and Paul Mitchell. 2005. *The Politics of Electoral Systems*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Golder, Matt 2003. Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe. *Comparative Political Studies* 36: 432-66.
- Grofman, Bernard and Arend Lijphart, *Electoral Laws and their Consequences*. New York: Agathon Press, 1986.
- Gunther, Richard. 1989. "Electoral Laws, Party Systems, and Elites: The Case of Spain," *American Political Science Review*, 83 (1989): 835-58.
- Horowitz, Donald (1991), 'Electoral Systems for a Divided Society', in Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa?* University of California Press.
- Jones, Mark P. *Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995.
- Katz, Richard. *A Theory of Party and Electoral Systems*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980.
- Lijphart, Arend "Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Poland, 1989-91," *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 4 (1992): 207-23.
- Lijphart, Arend (1991). 'The Alternative Vote: A Realistic Alternative for South Africa?', *Politikon* 18/2: 91-101.
- Lijphart, Arend and Bernard Grofman, eds., *Choosing an Electoral System. Issues and Alternatives*. New York: Praeger, 1985.
- Lijphart, Arend *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Lijphart, Arend. "The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945-1985." *American Political Science Review* 80 (June 1990): 481-96.
- Magar, Eric, Marc R. Rosenblum, and David Samuels (1998). "On the Absence of Centripetal Incentives in Double-Member Districts: The Case of Chile." *Comparative Political Studies* 31(6):714-739.

- Mainwaring, Scott. "Politicians, Parties, and Electoral Systems: Brazil in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics*, 24 (1991): 21-43.
- Moser, Robert G. "Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Postcommunist States," *World Politics* 51 (April 1999): 359-84.
- Moser, Robert G. "The Impact of Parliamentary Electoral Systems in Russia," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 13 (1997) 3: 284-302.
- Muller, Wolfgang C. 2007. Political institutions and linkage strategies. In *Patrons, Clients, and Policies*, Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, eds. New York; Cambridge University Press. 251-275.
- Norris, Pippa (2004). *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*. Cambridge University Press.
- Rae, Douglas W. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.
- Reed, Steven R. "Structure and Behaviour: Extending Duverger's Law to the Japanese Case," *British Journal of Political Science*, 29 (1991): 335-56.
- Reilly, Ben (2006), 'Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies', *Democratization*, 13:5, pp.811-27.
- Reilly, Benjamin (2001). *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management*. Oxford UP.
- Reynolds, Andrew. 2002. *The Architecture of democracy: Constitutional design, conflict management, and democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press (the chapters by Horowitz and Lijphart are VERY entertaining)
- Riker, William H. "The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science," *American Political Science Review*, 76 (1982): 753-66.
- Sani, Giacomo and Giovanni Sartori, "Polarization, Fragmentation, and Competition in Western Democracies," PP. 307-40 in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, eds., *Western European Party Systems*. Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage, 1983.
- Sartori, Giovanni. "The Influence of Electoral Systems: Faulty Laws or Faulty Method," pp. 43-68 in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, *Electoral Laws and their Consequences*. New York: Agathon Press, 1986.
- Sartori, Giovanni. *Comparative Constitutional Engineering*. New York: New York University Press, 1994. chapter 3.
- Shvetsova, Olga. "Endogenous Selection of Institutions and Their Exogenous Effects," *Constitutional Political Economy* 14 (September 2003): 191-212.
- Taagepera, Rein and Matthew Shugart. 1989. *Seats and Votes*.
- Chang, Eric C and Miriam Golden. 2007. Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption. *The British Journal of Political Science* 37 (1): 115-137
- Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 2004. Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes. *The American Economic Review* 94 (Mar): 25-45

Feb 19 Causes of Electoral Systems

- Boix, Carles (1999). "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies." *APSR* 93(3):609-624.
- Colomer, Josep. 2005. It's the Parties that Choose Electoral Systems (or Duverger's Laws Upside Down). *Political Studies* 53 (1): 1-21.
- Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 79-88.

- Thomas R. Cusack, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice, "Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems." *American Political Science Review* 101, 3 (August 2007), 373-91.
- Scheiner. 2008. "Does Electoral System Reform Work? Electoral System Lessons from Reforms of the 1990s." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11:161-81.
- Blais, Andre, Agnieszka Dobrzynska, and Indridi H. Indridason. 2004. To Adopt or Not to Adopt Proportional Representation: The Politics of Institutional Choice. *British Journal of Political Science* 35 (1): 182-190.
- Shugart, Matthew S. 2008. Inherent and Contingent Factors in Reform Initiation in Plurality Systems. In *To Keep or To Change First Past The Post: The Politics of Electoral Reform*, Andre Blais, ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

Recommended:

- Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. "Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions," *International Organization*, 41 (2): 203-23.
- Barkan, Joel, Paul Densham and Gerard Ruston (2006), 'Space Matters: Designing Better Electoral Systems for Emerging Democracies', *American Journal of Political Science* 50:4, 926-039.
- Bawn, Kathleen. 1993. The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 37 (1993): 965-89.
- Benoit, Kenneth "Models of Electoral System Change," *Electoral Studies* 22 (December 2003).
- Benoit, Kenneth and John W. Schieman, "Institutional Choice in New Democracies: Bargaining over Hungary's 1989 Electoral Law," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 13 (April 2001): 159-188.
- Carstairs, M. 1980. *A Short History of Electoral Systems in Western Europe*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1980.
- Chapman, David . 1991. *Can Civil Wars Be Avoided? Electoral and Constitutional Models for Ethnically Divided Countries*. London: The Institute for Social Inventions.
- Crisp, Brian and Rachael E. Ingall, "Institutional Engineering and the Nature of Representation: Mapping the Effects of Electoral Reform in Colombia," *American Journal of Political Science* 46:4 (2002): 733-48.
- *Designing Electoral Regimes*, special issue of *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 3 (Spring 1994), No. 2. (with inventory of electoral law provisions, 65-77.
- Kaminski, Marek M. "Do Parties Benefit from Electoral Manipulation? Electoral Laws and Heresthetics in Poland, 1989-93." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 14:3 (2002): 325-358.
- Katzenstein, Peter. *Small States in World Markets*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. pp. 136-57.
- Norris, Pippa *Electoral Engineering* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
- Remington, Thomas F. and Steven S. Smith, "Political Goals, Institutional Context, and the Choice of an Electoral System: The Russian Parliamentary Election Law," *American Journal of Political Science*, 40 (1996) 4: 1253-79.
- Remmer, Karen. 2008. The politics of institutional change: Electoral Reform in Latin America, 1978–2002. *Party Politics* 14 (1): 5-30.
- Sartori, Giovanni. *Comparative Constitutional Engineering*. New York: New York University Press, 1994. chapter 4.
- Shugart, Matthew Soberg. "Electoral Reform in Systems of Proportional Representation." *European Journal of Political Research* 21(1992): 207-224.

Feb 26 Presidentialism and Parliamentary

- Lijphart *Patterns of Democracy* Chapter 7
- Metcalf, Lee Kendall. 2000. Measuring presidential power. *Comparative political studies* 33 (5): 660-85.
- Shugart and Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies* 1-27, 76-166.
- Samuels, David and Matthew Shugart. 2010. *Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 3.

Recommended

- Tavits, Margit. 2009. *Presidents with Prime Ministers: Do Direct Elections Matter?* New York: Oxford University Press.
- Carey, John M. and Matthew Shugart, eds., *Executive Decree Authority*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Carey, John M. Octavio Amorim Neto, and Matthew Soberg Shugart, "Appendix: Outlines of Constitutional Powers in Latin America," pp. 440-460 in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Lijphart, Arend. *Parliamentary versus Presidential Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- McGregor, James. "The Presidency in East Central Europe," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Reports*, Vol. 2 (1994) 41: 23-31.
- Sartori, Giovanni. *Comparative Constitutional Engineering*. New York: New York University Press, 1994. chapters 5-7.
- *The Postcommunist Presidency*. special issue of *East European Constitutional Review*, Fall 1993-winter 1994 (with inventory of the powers of post-communist presidents, pp. 82-94).

Mar 5 The Effects of Presidentialism

Note: Class will meet from 6-8:30 today

- Cox, Gary and Scott Morganstern. 2001. "Latin America's Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents." *Comparative Politics* 33 (2): 171-190.
- Hallerberg, Mark and Patrik Marier. 2004. Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries. *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (3): 571-87.
- Horowitz, Donald, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Juan J. Linz, "Debate—Presidents vs. Parliaments," *Journal of Democracy* 1, 4 (Fall 1990), 73-91.
- Linz and Valenzuela, eds. *The Failure of Presidential Democracy*, contributions by Linz (3-87), Lijphart (91-105), Sartori (106-18) and Stepan and Skach (119-36).
- Shugart and Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies*, pp. 28-75, 154-58, 166-272.
- Cheibub, Jose Antonio and Fernando Limongi. 2002. Democratic institutions and regime survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered. *Annual Review of Political Science*. 151-79.
- Aleman, Eduardo and Thomas Schwartz. 2006. Presidential Vetoes in Latin American Constitutions. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 18 (1): 98-120.

Recommended

- Kim, Young Hun and Donna Bahry. 2008. Interrupted Presidencies in Third Wave Democracies. *Journal of Politics* 70(3): 807-822.
- Negretto, Gabriel. "Minority Presidents and Democratic Performance in Latin America," *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 48, No. 3, Fall 2006, pp. 63-92.
- Kim, Young Hun and Donna Bahry. 2008. "Interrupted Presidencies in Third Wave Democracies." *Journal of Politics* 70 (3): 807-822.
- Perez-Linan, Anibal. 2007. Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Giovanni Sartori, *Comparative Constitutional Engineering*. New York: New York University Press, 1994. chapters 11 and 12.
- Hammond, T.H. and C.K. Butler, "Some Complex Answers to the Simple Question: 'Do Institutions Matter?': Policy Choice and Policy Change in Presidential and Parliamentary Systems," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15(April 2003): 145-200.
- Harmel, Robert and Kenneth Janda, *Parties and Their Environment*. New York: Longman, 1982.
- Hellman, Joel "Constitutions and Economic Reform in the Postcommunist Transition," *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 5 (Winter 1996): 46-56.
- Jones, Mark "Presidential Election Laws and Multipartyism in Latin America," *Political Research Quarterly*, 47 (1994): 41-57.
- Mainwaring, Scott "Presidentialism, Multipartyism, and Democracy. The Difficult Combination," *Comparative Political Studies*, 26 (1993) 2: 198-228.
- Mainwaring, Scott and Matthew Soberg Shugart, "Conclusion: Presidentialism and the Party System," pp. 394-439 in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Mainwaring, Scott P. and Matthew S. Shugart eds. (1997). *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. Cambridge UP.
- Moe, Terry M. and Michael Caldwell, "The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems," *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 150 (1994): 171-95.
- Power, Timothy J. and Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation in the Third World," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 39 (1997) 2: 123-55.
- Shugart, Matthew Soberg "The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government," *American Political Science Review*, 89 (1995): 327-43.
- Shugart, Matthew Soberg and Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America: Rethinking the Terms of the Debate," pp. 12-54 in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Taras, Raymond ed., *Post-Communist Presidents*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Mar 19 The Choice of Executive Institutions

- Baylis, Thomas A. "Presidents versus Prime Ministers. Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe," *World Politics*, 48:3 (1996): 297-323.
- Easter, Gerald M. "Preference for Presidentialism. Postcommunist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS," *World Politics*, 49 (1997) 2: 184-211.
- Frye, Timothy "The Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies," *Comparative Political Studies*, 30 (October 1997): 523-553.
- Shugart, Matthew S. "The Inverse Relationship Between Party Strength And Executive Strength: A Theory of Politicians' Constitutional Choices," *British Journal of Political Science*, 1998.

- Negretto, Gabriel. "Choosing How to Choose Presidents: Parties, Military Rulers, and Presidential Elections in Latin America," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 68, No. 2, May 2006, pp. 421-33.
- Aleman, Eduardo and George Tsebelis. 2005. The Origins of Presidential Conditional Agenda-Setting Power in Latin America. *Latin American Research Review* 40 (2): 3-26.

Recommended:

- Crawford, Beverly and Arend Lijphart, eds., *Post-Communist Transformation in Eastern Europe*. special issue of *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 28, no. 2, 1995.
- Lijphart, Arend and Carlos H. Waisman, eds., *Institutional Design in New Democracies. Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996.
- Sartori, Giovanni. *Comparative Constitutional Engineering*. New York: New York University Press, 1994. chapter 10.

March 26: Governance in Parliamentary Regimes

- Lijphart Chapter 6
- Strom, Kaare, Wolfgang C. Müller, Torbjorn Bergman. 2008. *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press. All
- Huber, John D. and Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo. 2008. "Replacing Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Stability in Parliamentary Democracy." *American Political Science Review* 102 (May), 169-80.

Recommended:

- Laver, Michael J. and Kenneth Shepsle, "Coalitions and Cabinet Government," *American Political Science Review* 84, 3 (September 1990): 873-90.
- Martin, Lanny W. and Randolph T. Stevenson. 2001. Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies. *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (1): 33-50.
- Diermeier, Daniel and Randolph T. Stevenson. 2000. Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events. *The American Political Science Review* 94 (3): 627-40.
- David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks, "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," *American Political Science Review* 82, 2 (June 1988), 405-422.
- Michael Laver, "Models of Government Formation," *Annual Review of Political Science* 1 (1998): 1-25.
- Michael J. Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Coalitions and Cabinet Government," *American Political Science Review* 84, 3 (September 1990), 873-90.
- David P. Baron and John A. Ferejohn, "Bargaining in Legislatures." *American Political Science Review* 83, 4 (December 1989), 1181-1206.
- Royce Carroll and Gary W. Cox, "The Logic of Gamson's Law: Pre-election Coalitions and Portfolio Allocations." *American Journal of Political Science* 51, 2 (April 2007), 251-65.
- Abram De Swaan, *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: A Study of Formal Theories of Coalition Formation Applied to Nine European Parliaments after 1918*. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1973.
- Arthur W. Lupia and Kaare Strøm, "Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections." *American Political Science Review* 89, 3 (September 1995), 648-65.
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